In this paper, we study the problem of keyword searches over asymmetrically encrypted data. 
Introduction
In traditional public key encryption system, we use the issued public key to encrypt all information of the recipient who then decrypt with the corresponding private decryption key, which cannot satisfy the requirement of users to search. Public key encryption with keyword search is a new application for above demands, in which we needs a more flexible encryption algorithm, providing a method to search dispensing with decryption or only decrypting data partially without violating data privacy. In searchable public key encryption, anyone can encrypt data using a public key, while only the owner of the corresponding private key can generate correct trapdoor and can perform retrieving and decryption to encrypted data, can also delegate a decryption key to other users.
Searchable encryption is a cryptographic primitive which enables users to perform keyword searches on an encrypted database, just as in a common database. However, to limit existing scheme to single user setting is unsatisfactory. To support multiuser searches, Curtmola et. al. [1] directly extend their single user scheme by sharing the secret key among all users. But, extending a single user scheme to such a multiuser scheme is an unsecure and inefficient approach. Feng Bao et.al. [2] present a different scheme, in which each one in group possessing a distinct secret key, can insert cipher text to the database, while user in the group, with the assistance from a semi-trusted database server, can search all the records containing selective keywords. But, it is no doubt that their scheme is insecure. Because, firstly, the secret key for encrypting records is generated by user manager, and query and complementary key also be known by the user manager. Secondly, the server posses the complementary key list of users. Besides, their scheme must afford extra storage and communication cost, because user manager and the server have to maintain additional secret keys respectively, and index generating and write operation is interacted between the user and server, assuredly, the storage overhead of the server and the communication must be increased. The efficiency of a scheme is evaluated by the complexity of the scheme, and the security of a scheme shows the ability of the scheme in hiding both the message and the associated keywords, from adversaries So, the main considerations of searchable encryption, security and efficiency, can not be achieved by their scheme.. Security models are formally proposed to define the security, where each model defines certain resources for computations and restrictions for the adversary. Since security is never free, there is a trade off between efficiency and security. Searchable encryption schemes have a higher complexity when achieving security in a security model with a more powerful adversary. The best trade off is achieved when the scheme achieves certain level of security with the lowest possible complexity. In the past research, many schemes are proposed in a random oracle model. A random oracle is a function that maps an input value to a true random output value. In the random oracle model, anyone including the adversary has access to a random oracle. However, a public key searchable encryption scheme which is secure in the random oracle model does not mean that the scheme is also secure in the standard model.
Most existing searchable encryption scenarios either based on complex bilinear pairing operation or required random oracle model [8] [9] [10], they need a plenty of computation overhead and storage capacity on both server and client, so it is somewhat impractical for the users with limited bandwidth, small memory devices, and weak computation ability. In our scheme, we design a new scenario of searchable public key encryption based on RSA assumption, it is efficient for search and is proven secure in standard model. What's more, we extend our scheme to multiuser setting, which also can achieve efficient computation and communication overhead and effectively manage the storage in a server.
Related work
The concept of searchable encryption is first introduced by Song, Wagner and Perrig who consider searches across encrypted keywords within a file, with an overhead linear to the file size, and also presented practical solution [3] . Later, Goh propose to search encrypted indexes in documents and they define the notion of security for searchable encryption and constructed an efficient scheme using Bloom Filter [4] . Chang and Mitzenmacher improve the search efficiency at the cost of a large storage by constructing a set of indexes [6] . Moreover, several works were also introduced to improve the efficiency of the system and provide strong security [1] [5] [7] . Boneh et. al. first addressed public key encryption with keyword search(PEKS) based on several assumption [8] , where the private key holder can perform a search among messages encrypted under the corresponding public key. In addition, Waters et. al. constructed efficiently encrypted and searchable audit log system from the public key searchable encryption [7] . Park et. al [10] and Hwang et. al. [11] propose variation of conjunctive keywords search in the public key setting. Abdalla et. al [5] further analyze the consistency property of public key and demonstrate a generic construction by transforming an anonymous identity-based encryption scheme. Note that while public key based schemes should allow for not only single user, but also multiuser most of time. As a result, it is imperative to apply public key based searchable encryption schemes to the multiuser setting. Curtmola et. al suggest in [1] to employ broadcast encryption to allow multiuser search, it is unsuitable for a dynamic database. The scheme [9] allows a group of users share data in a way so that all users are able to search an encrypted database without sharing their secrets and it can be used for a dynamic database. But, on the one hand, both the secret key for encrypting records and complementary key are known by the user manager and the server respectively, and on the other hand index generating and write operation in their scheme is interacted between the user and server, so their scheme is neither secure nor efficient.
By contrast, our scheme in this paper, only private key holder in one group can generate trapdoor and search information from the server, which provides the privacy protecting for the users. Further, encrypting process of the keywords is only executed by the client and independent on the server, which minimizes the communication and storage overhead for both the server and user.
Organization of this paper:
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 3, we define a new model for PEKS scheme and introduce hardness assumption for our construction. In section 4, we construct a simple and efficient PEKS scheme and prove the security of our scheme in the standard model. In section 5, we extend our single user PEKS to multiuser setting and analyze the security of our schemes. In section 6, we analyze the efficiency of our scheme. Finally, we give concluding remarks and express the acknowledgement to all people who instruct this paper accomplishment.
Preliminaries

Model
We assume the standard model for asymmetric searchable encryption scheme (as used in [7] [8] [10] ), which includes mail server that stores all incoming emails. In designed protocol, our goal is to enable client Anna to send a short Trapdoor T w generated by secret key to the mail server that will enable server to locate all messages containing keyword w, but learn nothing else. To do so, client first generates an encrypted keyword (also called as index) I i for each document and stores both the index and encrypted document E(D i ) on the server. Here, we assume that E is an arbitrary asymmetric encryption algorithm, such as RSA or Elgamal, and is independent of our index construction. To search the document collection for a given keyword w, the client generates and sends a trapdoor T w to the server who proceeds to search each index for w, the server then returns the appropriate set of documents to the client.
The public key encryption with keyword search consists of four polynomial time algorithm (Kengen, PEKS, Trapdoor, Test) such that: Kengen: The algorithm inputs security parameter and returns the public/private key pair (pk, sk). PEKS: The sender takes the public key pk and keyword w as the input of algorithm which produces a searchable keyword encryption S, S=PEKS(pk, w). Trapdoor:The searcher input the secret key sk and keyword w, the algorithm returns a trapdoor T w of a given keyword query, T w =Trapdoor(sk, w). Test: Is executed by the server to search the document with the keyword of a trapdoor T w , it inputs the public key pk, the searchable keyword encryption S, and queried trapdoor T q , then output '1' if S includes w and '0' otherwise. In fact, in the PEKS scheme, to send a message m with keyword w, the cipher text has a form of <Enc (pk,m),PEKS(pk,w)>,where Enc(.) is a secure asymmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt document, while, we only concentrate on searchable encryption part in our protocol.
Adversarial models for PEKS
We consider a semantic security against chosen keyword attacks as mentioned in the previous work [8] [11] . The security of our PEKS scheme can be defined by the following game ( Indistinguishability against adaptively Chosen Keyword Attack:
The challenger takes a security parameter 1 k and runs the Kengen algorithm. The public key pk is given to adversary A. The challenger C keeps the secret key sk to itself. 
RSA assumption
We begin by recalling two assumptions about RSA in this section. 
PEKS scheme
Construction
We introduce a new and simple PEKS based on strong RSA assumption in the standard scheme. Our scheme has efficient communication and storage overhead. In addition, we provide a concrete security proof of our scheme. Setup(1 k ): Setup algorithm choose an RSA modules N, which is the product of two large prime p,q. 
Trapdoor(sk,w):
To produce the trapdoor of w, the algorithm first computes appropriate primes as follows, i from 1 to n, it computes ) (
If so, output "yes", if not, output "no". Proof: We now prove that our scheme is IND-CKA over the RSA assumption in the standard model. Suppose there is an adversary A against the above PEKS scheme for n-bit keyword that makes at most q(  ) queries where q( ) is a polynomial and succeeds in breaking with probability  . We show that this adversary can be used to break strong RSA with probability approximately ) This completes the description of algorithm. The adversary B should not abort in Trapdoor Queries and Challenge phase for the success. We know that B correctly outputs with probability at least ) /(   qnl is negligible, so the probability of adversary A in breaking our PEKS scheme is also negligible.
Security and proof
/(   qnl ,
Multiuser PEKS scheme
Model
In this section, we extend our PEKS scheme to a multiuser PEKS scheme. In a PEKS model, a user outsources his data to the storage of a server which stores data for a number of users. Suppose user Anna wants to send an encrypted email to a number of recipients in an email routing system. To route the email to devices of recipients in the email gateway, Anna would encrypt the same document and the same keywords with the public key of the recipients repeatedly. A multiuser PEKS scheme can eliminate repeated operations and reduce the communication overhead for a number of users. In the public key model and IBE model, the systems for a multi-receiver have been investigated to reduce the communication and computation cost [14] [15] [16] [17] . A PECK (public key encryption with conjunctive keyword search) has been proposed [11] . For the multiuser PEKS scheme，it is more important to consider storage and communication overhead since all of the cipher texts must be stored in the storage of the server. However, their scheme is under the umbrella of random oracle model. So, in this paper, we construct first multiuser PEKS scheme without random oracle.
We first define a model for the multiuser public key encryption with keyword search (abbreviate it as mPEKS) and a security game for it. The mPEKS is modeled by combining the multi-receiver public key encryption and the PEKS scheme. Let n be the number of users, the mPEKS consists of four polynomial time algorithms (Kengen, mPEKS, Trapdoor, Test) such that: Kengen: Inputs a security parameter and returns the public/private key pairs of n users as (pk 1 ,sk 1 )……(pk n ,sk n ). mPEKS: Is executed by the sender to encrypt keyword w, it produces a searchable key encryption S of w with the n public key (pk 1 ,……,pk n ). Trapdoor:Is executed by the jth user to search the documents with the keywords w of a trapdoor T j , input the secret key sk j and query w, produces the trapdoor of the query.
Test:
Takes as input the public key pk j , the searchable keyword encryption S, and the trapdoor T j , outputs '1' if S includes w and '0' otherwise.
Adversarial model
We define the security game for mPEKS system, we consider a semantic security against adaptively chosen keyword attacks. In our security game, the adversary is given the public key for n users in the setup phase, and the keyword set is encrypted with m public keys. In addition, the adversary issues the trapdoor query with keyword, the security of the mPEKS scheme can be also defined by the following (Indistinguishability against adaptively chosen keyword attack: IND-mPEKS-CKA) game: Setup: The challenger takes a security parameter k and runs the Kengen algorithm. The n public keys (pk 1 ,……,pk m ) and the system parameters params k are given to A. The challenger C keeps the secret keys (sk 1 ,……, sk m ) to itself. 
Adv
where  is negligible.
Construction
We can construct an efficient multiuser system as mEnc(pk……pk m ,m)+mPEKS(pk……pk m ,w), where mEnc ) ( is a multiuser encryption algorithm using for encrypting documents, and mPEKS ) ( is another different encryption algorithm using for encryption keywords corresponding documents. In our protocol, we only consider the latter as follows:
Setup ( . Finally, ) , (
 . If so, output "yes", if not, output "no".
Security and proof
We now prove that our scheme is IND-mPEKS -CKA secure over the RSA assumption in the standard model. Challenge: Eventually A selects a pair of target keyword w 0 and w 1 that it wishes to be challenged on and sends them to the challenger C, the only restriction is that w 0 and w 1 This completes the description of algorithm. The adversary B should not abort in Trapdoor Queries and Challenge phase for the success. We know that B correctly outputs with probability at least ) /(   qnl is negligible, so the probability of adversary A in breaking our PEKS scheme is also negligible.
Efficiency analysis
Multiuser searchable encryption had been introduced by Feng Bao et.al. [2] and Y. H. Hwang [11] . In this section, we compare the efficiency of our scheme with previous works. Suppose n is the number of the users, and h is the output of the hash function H, let l denote the number of record sets, p denotes a pairing operation, e is exponentiation operation. Then we can get the following results: From the table 1 above, we know that the main computation our scheme is exponentiation and hash computation, but the scheme in [2] and [11] include hash, exponentiation and pairing computation. From the data in line three, we know that the scheme [2] is independent of the number of users, while both [11] and our scheme is asymptotical linear to the number of users. So, [2] is the most efficient of the three schemes. But the high efficiency in [2] is at the cost of low security. The scheme [11] needs that user to perform bilinear maps operation, but a number of the maps computations impose burden to a user with limited resources. But, user in our scheme needs only one private key in secure device and servers who cannot obtain the private key cannot represent user to perform trapdoor generating operations, and also cannot decrypt any cipher text. Furthermore, the process of keyword encryption, trapdoor generation and test need only hash and exponential computation and do not need complicated bilinear pairing operations. So, our scheme can balance between efficiency and security.
